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The Open Our Democracy Act:  
A Proposal for Effective Election Reform 
NIEL FRANZESE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 31, 2014 Representative John Delaney, a Democrat from 
Maryland, introduced H.R. 5334 to the House of Representatives.1 The title 
of the bill was the “Open Our Democracy Act,”2 and he described it as  
[a] bill to require all candidates for election for the office of 
Member of the House of Representatives to run in a single 
open primary regardless of political party preference, [and] to 
limit the ensuing general election for such office to the two 
candidates receiving the greatest number of votes in such 
single open primary . . . .3 
This bill represents the latest in a long line of calls for congressional 
election reform from both Democrats4 and Republicans.5 The most recent 
high-profile calls for election reform in the news have focused on 
campaign finance reform,6 but Representative Delaney’s bill turns its 
attention to three less-often discussed proposals. His three proposals are 
first, implementing open primaries for House elections; second, making 
                                                                                                                          
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2016; University of Connecticut, B.S. 
2013. I would like to thank Professor Douglas M. Spencer and the editors of the Connecticut Law 
Review for their thoughtful feedback and editing. 
1 H.R. 5334, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014).  
2 Id. Throughout this Comment, H.R. 5334 will be referred to interchangeably as “the Open Our 
Democracy Act,” “the bill,” and “the Act”. 
3 H.R. 5334. 
4 Ari Berman, Election Reform Should Be a Top Priority for the New Congress, NATION (Jan. 23, 
2013), http://www.thenation.com/blog/172385/election-reform-should-be-top-priority-new-congress 
[http://perma.cc/6CZL-CM4D] (“On two major occasions—during his election-night speech and 
second inaugural address—President Obama has highlighted the need for election reform.”). 
5 Endorsers of Instant Runoff Voting, CTR. FOR VOTING & DEMOCRACY, 
http://www.fairvote.org/reforms/instant-runoff-voting/endorsers-of-instant-runoff-voting/#.Ub-
a5_kcezl [http://perma.cc/Y7RY-TDV7] (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (listing members of Congress from 
both parties who support adopting Instant Runoff Voting systems, including Republican Senator John 
McCain).   
6 See Robert Kelner & Raymond la Raja, McCain-Feingold’s Devastating Legacy, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mccain-feingolds-devastating-legacy/2014/ 
04/11/14a528e2-c18f-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3_story.html [http://perma.cc/S38N-EK7J] (discussing 
calls for change after the Supreme Court’s decisions in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), and 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014), after the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act). 
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Election Day a federal holiday; and third, beginning the process of 
redistricting reform.7 In an op-ed for the Washington Post, Representative 
Delaney highlighted the need for congressional election reform: 
“Representative democracy is in crisis in the United States. One of the 
three pillars of our system of government—the legislative branch—is 
failing.”8 He cited problems with the current Congress, including the 
federal government shutdown, minimal legislative activity, a struggling 
middle class, and the unaddressed problem of aging infrastructure as 
examples of the dysfunction in Congress.9 Sharing the frustrations of the 
approximately 80% of Americans who disapprove of Congress,10 he wrote, 
“we can’t let 535 people continue to limit the progress of a nation of more 
than 300 million.”11 He was motivated to propose his package of election 
reforms after considering the structural issues in the electoral process that 
have “created perverse incentives that have warped our democracy and 
empowered special interests and a vocal minority.”12 He cites this 
dysfunction as the “logical result”13 of closed partisan primaries, a surplus 
of gerrymandered districts that ensure the election of the same party year in 
and year out, and low voter turnout.14  
His first proposal—single open primaries in which all voters can 
participate, regardless of party affiliation—is aimed at giving independent 
and moderate voters a larger voice than they presently have.15 Under this 
system, candidates for office are selected by all eligible voters, and the top 
two vote-getters advance to the general election.16 Representative Delaney 
says that high levels of dissatisfaction in the electorate should not be 
surprising when candidates are selected using “a partisan primary filter”17 
that creates low voter turnout and results in “an incentive to appeal only to 
the most committed—and ideological—voters.”18 With open primaries, the 
ability to win votes outside of a narrow, ideologically committed base 
becomes more important, even in districts where the top two candidates are 
likely to come from the same political party.19  
The second proposal is simply aimed at making it easier to vote.20 
                                                                                                                          
7 John K. Delaney, How to Fix Congress, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2014, at A15.  
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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Representative Delaney cited early poll closing times creating difficulty for 
working parents “who have to commute from work to day care to home to 
a polling place”21 as his primary motivation, but other issues, such as long 
stretches of waiting in line to vote,22 could also be remedied by this 
proposal. 
The third proposal, redistricting reform, is intended to remedy the 
problems that have resulted from partisan gerrymandering.23 Redistricting 
for congressional elections occurs every ten years after the national census 
is taken and congressional representation numbers are calculated, as 
required by the Constitution.24 The States have varying methods of 
redistricting,25 and, over the years, repeated redistricting has resulted in the 
creation of districts that are stretched over odd boundaries in an attempt to 
ensure that one party is guaranteed election by creating districts with 
unbeatable majorities.26 These “one party enclaves”27 make it so that 
Representatives’ “main concern is making the most rabid faction of their 
parties happy.”28 “According to the Cook Political Report, only 16 percent 
of House districts are competitive.”29 In Representative Delaney’s 
experience, Representatives from these competitive districts have been 
much more likely to work towards compromises on a bipartisan basis.30 
Representatives from heavily gerrymandered districts do not feel the same 
incentives to compromise since they do not have to act on behalf of their 
entire district, but only on behalf of those who will guarantee their 
reelection.31 The Open Our Democracy Act calls for the Comptroller 
General,32 a member of the Government Accountability Office,33 to 
“examine the feasibility of national standards for drawing district lines,”34 
                                                                                                                          
21 Id. 
22 Phillip Bump, Planning to Vote? Here’s How Long You Could Wait, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/11/03/planning-to-vote-tomorrow-it-
should-take-15-minutes/ [http://perma.cc/QVV8-ABQQ].  
23 Delaney, supra note 7. 
24 Congressional Redistricting, FAIRVOTE.ORG, http://archive.fairvote.org/redistricting/ 
redistricting.htm [http://perma.cc/S2QE-C5QS] (last visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
25 Redistricting Commissions: Legislative Plans, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(June 25, 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/2009-redistricting-commissions-table.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/3PJC-A6KD].  
26 Christopher Ingraham, What 60 Years of Political Gerrymandering Looks Like, WASH. POST 
(May 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/05/21/what-60-years-of-
political-gerrymandering-looks-like/ [http://perma.cc/9KYG-THNM].  
27 Delaney, supra note 7. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 H.R. 5334, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014). 
33 Delaney, supra note 7. 
34 Id. 
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an important first step to determine the best direction for redistricting 
reform to take. “Let’s examine what works—a number of states provide 
good examples—and develop a framework,”35 Representative Delaney 
urges.  
The most convincing point made by Representative Delaney in his 
Washington Post piece was his call to action. “We need to act. Low voter 
turnout, gerrymandering and non-competitive elections are creating a 
frightening negative feedback loop. As mainstream voters grow 
increasingly disgusted and apathetic, only extreme partisans stay 
interested, creating more race-to-the-base contests, which then turn off 
more moderates and on and on.”36  
This Comment examines the current state of the problems that each of 
these three reforms seeks to address and how the Act seeks to solve the 
problem. Ultimately, it argues that the three reforms in concert would have 
a greater effect than each would alone. Part II discusses single open 
primaries for congressional elections. Part III considers Election Day as a 
federal holiday, and Part IV discusses congressional redistricting reform. 
Finally, Part V discusses the Open Our Democracy Act as a coherent 
package of reforms and argues in support of Representative Delaney’s 
statement that “[e]ach of the reforms in the Open Our Democracy Act, 
individually, would help counteract the dysfunction that has broken 
Congress. Taken together, they can do more than that”37 with the end goal 
of “mak[ing] the House of Representatives actually representative.”38 
II.  SINGLE OPEN PRIMARIES FOR CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 
Section 2 of the Act is titled “Election of Members of House of 
Representatives Through Open Primaries.”39 It calls for a single open 
primary election for each office, followed by a single general election for 
each office.40 The open primary is to be conducted such that “each 
candidate for such office, regardless of the candidate’s political party 
preference, shall appear on a single ballot”41 and “each voter in the State 
who is eligible to vote in elections for Federal office in the Congressional 
district involved may cast a ballot in the election, regardless of the voter’s 
political party preference.”42 In the subsequent general election, only the 
“[two] candidates receiving the greatest number of votes in the single open 
                                                                                                                          
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 H.R. 5334, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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primary election[,] . . . without regard to the political party preference of 
such candidates[,]”43 would appear on the ballot.44 
Under Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, the 
ultimate power to regulate the times, places, and manner of holding 
elections for Representatives is reserved to Congress.45 The first part of 
that Clause assigns the power to the States and their respective legislatures, 
but the second part states that “the Congress may at any time by Law make 
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] 
Senators,”46 thus explicitly granting Congress authority to modify existing 
systems for electing Representatives.47 
A.  This Proposed Reform Aims to Remove the Incentives to Increase 
Political Polarization that Are Associated with Current Primary 
Systems 
Political parties have been around for almost as long as the country has 
been in existence,48 but states did not begin to create legislation providing 
for primary elections by political parties in order to select candidates for 
the general election until the 1890s.49 “By 1910, 22 states had enacted laws 
establishing direct primary systems, and by 1916, primaries were being 
conducted in 26 states.”50  
1.  In Theory, Currently Existing Closed and Semi-Closed Primaries 
Incentivize Candidates to Appeal to the Most Extreme Components 
of Their Parties 
Four general types of primary elections developed in the United States 
via the experimentation of individual states.51 These are the closed 
primary, the semi-closed primary, the open primary, and the blanket 
primary.52 “Primaries exist on a spectrum from closed to open, with the 
blanket primary being the purest form of an open primary.”53 
In the closed primary election system, only party members 
(who are otherwise eligible to vote) are permitted to vote in a 
                                                                                                                          
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
46 Id. 
47 160 CONG. REC. H7186 (daily ed. July 31, 2014) (statement of Rep. Delaney).  
48 Robin Miller, Annotation, Constitutionality of Candidate Participation Provisions for Primary 
Elections, 121 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2013). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Chenwei Zhang, Towards a More Perfect Election: Improving the Top-Two Primary for 
Congressional and State Races, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 615, 620 (2012). 
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party’s primary election. In the semi-closed primary system, 
unaffiliated voters (independents) otherwise eligible to vote 
are permitted to vote in a party’s primary election if the party 
chooses to permit their voting. Otherwise, as in the closed 
primary, only party members are permitted to vote. In the 
open primary system, all persons eligible to vote may, 
regardless of party affiliation, choose the party in whose 
primary they will vote, although voters are restricted to 
participating in one party’s primary. The blanket primary 
system, in its partisan version, takes this vision farther and 
permits each voter to vote in a different party’s primary for 
each office.54 
Closed and semi-closed primaries have the benefit of promoting “party 
unity and prevent[ing] nonmembers from ‘raiding’ a party’s election, 
which occurs when a voter votes for the perceived weakest candidate from 
the opposing party in an attempt to pit that candidate against his or her 
preferred candidate.”55 However, these primaries sacrifice the full 
participation of voters in a district in order to limit raiding. In the current 
two-party system, sacrificing the participation of voters outside of the party 
means that a candidate’s best bet in a closed primary is to appeal to his 
party’s most active and loyal voters, who are often the most ideologically 
polarized.56  
Open primaries make primaries “conducive to voter participation by 
more openly welcoming voters who are independent or not decidedly 
partisan,”57 but “may encourage political raiding, which is what the closed 
primary is designed to prevent.”58 In blanket primaries “[a]ll candidates 
from all political parties appear on a single ballot, and the most popular 
candidate from each party becomes the party’s nominee.”59 Traditional 
blanket primaries preserve partisan divisions by having the most popular 
candidate from each party become that party’s nominee; the subsequent 
general election will still have one Republican running against one 
                                                                                                                          
54 Miller, supra note 48. 
55 Zhang, supra note 53. 
56 See Section 1: Growing Ideological Consistency, PEW RESEARCH CTR., http://www.people-
press.org/2014/06/12/section-1-growing-ideological-consistency [http://perma.cc/X9SQ-LQGE] (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2015) (combining data from five Pew Research Center surveys to demonstrate in an 
infographic that “as ideological consistency has become more common, it has become increasingly 
aligned with partisanship”); Section 5: Political Engagement and Activism, PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/section-5-political-engagement-and-activism/ [http://perma.cc 
/TE65-DALN] (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (concluding based on the same data that the most polarized 
voters are the most politically active in primaries).  
57 Zhang, supra note 53, at 621. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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Democrat, even if those two candidates were not truly the two most 
popular.  
2.   A Single Open Primary Will Incentivize Candidates to Appeal to 
the Center 
The system proposed by Representative Delaney differs slightly from 
these four general categories. Generally, in an open primary, each eligible 
voter chooses which party’s primary he or she will vote in.60 This 
description assumes that each political party is still conducting a separate 
primary to choose its own candidate to be presented in the general election. 
In Representative Delaney’s formulation, there is a “single open 
primary,”61 meaning that all candidates are included together in one 
primary, regardless of party, and all voters participate in that single 
primary election to choose candidates to move on to the general election. 
This system has also been described as a “top-two primary,”62 a 
“nonpartisan blanket primary,”63 and a “Jungle Primary.”64 The unifying 
theme is that these “primaries are . . . multipartisan: the top two vote 
getters, regardless of party affiliation, face off against each other in the 
general election.”65 This system is derived from the blanket primary,66 but 
“departs from the blanket primary because the top two vote-getters go on 
to the general election, regardless of political party.”67 This system 
converts the purpose of the primary election from selecting the nominee 
for each party into “winnow[ing] the list of candidates for the general 
election.”68 
Representative Delaney is not alone in thinking these systems may 
“actually create[] an electoral system that favors centrists rather than 
politicians who play to their party’s base;”69 Senator Chuck Schumer wrote 
a July 2014 op-ed in the New York Times stating his case for “a national 
movement to adopt the ‘top-two’ primary (also known as an open 
primary), in which all voters, regardless of party registration, can vote and 
the top two vote-getters, regardless of party, then enter a runoff.”70 This 
system “essentially converts a traditional primary into a general election, 
                                                                                                                          
60 Miller, supra note 48. 
61 H.R. 5334, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014) (emphasis added). 
62 Joe Klein, California’s New Jungle Primary System, TIME (May 15, 2014), http://time.com/ 
100556/the-jungle-primary/ [http://perma.cc/DNX8-335H].  
63 Miller, supra note 48. 
64 Klein, supra note 62. 
65 Id. 
66 Zhang, supra note 53, at 621. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 622. 
69 Klein, supra note 62. 
70 Charles E. Schumer, End Partisan Primaries, Save America, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2014, at A0.  
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and a traditional general election into a runoff election.”71 
B.  Empirical Studies on the Limited Data Available Have Found Little if 
Any Effect of the Openness of Primary Elections on the Extremity of 
the Politicians They Produce  
Despite the intuitive appeal of the theory that open primaries will have 
a moderating effect on the candidates that are ultimately elected, analysis 
of available data on legislators’ ideological positions and the primary 
systems that elected them has failed to show this relationship, and in some 
cases has even shown that more open primaries elect legislators who are 
more extreme.72 A study led by Eric McGhee at the Public Policy Institute 
of California looked at data from most states for the years from 1992 to 
2010 to test for a “selection effect”—that is, whether or not different 
primary systems encourage more moderate legislators to run and whether 
they help the ones who do run win more often.73 This “selection effect” is 
contrasted to a “conversion effect,” which is a measure of whether or not 
incumbent legislators change their issue positions to reflect the changing 
incentive structure of a new primary system.74 Studies on the conversion 
effect have found that “incumbents rarely change their minds [in these 
situations], and when they do, that change is limited.”75 As for the selection 
effect, McGhee found that levels of polarization were mostly constant for 
both major parties across different types of primary election systems.76 
However, McGhee concluded that the study’s “findings generally fail to 
reject the null hypothesis of no effect from primary systems.”77 Notably, 
this study was constrained by the limitation that not all states had adopted 
different primary systems in the time frame analyzed.78 However, McGhee 
noted that some studies had found an effect of nomination systems on 
polarization in the state of California,79 one of the few states that had 
implemented an open primary similar to the one contemplated by the Act, 
before concluding that “analysis shows that concluding much from this 
relationship would be premature.”80 
                                                                                                                          
71 Zhang, supra note 53, at 617. 
72 Eric McGhee et al., A Primary Cause of Partisanship? Nomination Systems and Legislator 
Ideology, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 337, 337–38 (2014).  
73 Id. at 341.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 343.  
77 Id. at 347.  
78 Id. at 334. The information in these graphs is limited because it does not account for relevant 
variation between states. Some states have changed their primary systems, and others are not present in 
early or late years of the data set, so the precise group of states in each category is not constant.  
79 Id. at 349 (“Indeed, California is virtually the only state where a change in primary system has 
produced the expected moderating effect.”). 
80 Id.  
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A different study by Shideo Hirano at Columbia University found little 
to no evidence that the threat of primary competition, like the threat that 
would be present to incumbents in open primaries, had any effect on 
congressional partisan polarization.81 Hirano’s study was focused on 
testing whether or not any type of primary produces partisan polarization 
in the Representatives that it elects.82 At the outset Hirano noted that 
“[a]lthough the conventional wisdom suggests that the introduction of 
primary elections will have a polarizing effect on the positions of members 
of Congress, there are surprisingly few empirical studies that test this idea 
directly.”83 Hirano went on to test this idea, and found that “even when the 
ideological composition of the primary electorate appears to be relatively 
extreme [as theoretically is the case in a closed primary] or when the threat 
of primary competition appears to be particularly strong [as would be the 
case in an open primary],”84 “various empirical investigations suggest that 
primary elections do not have a large impact on [Representatives’] roll call 
voting positions.”85 
Another study by Douglas Ahler at the University of California, 
Berkeley focused on California’s 2012 primaries, noting that they were the 
first to be conducted under a new top-two format.86 In his paper, Ahler 
cited studies concluding that open primaries do moderate political 
outcomes, as well as others finding that open primaries failed to moderate 
politicians.87 However, upon conducting his own study, Ahler found that 
voters failed to distinguish between moderate and extreme candidates 
under the new primary system.88 Ahler attributed this to the fact that voters 
appeared to know so little about candidates’ positions that they could not 
have intentionally cast ballots for more moderate candidates even if they 
had wanted to.89 
                                                                                                                          
81 Shigeo Hirano et al., Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress, 5 Q.J. 
POL. SCI. 169, 169 (2010).  
82 Id. at 170.  
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 172.  
85 Id.  
86 DOUGLAS AHLER ET AL., DO OPEN PRIMARIES IMPROVE REPRESENTATION? 1, 
https://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~glenz/openprimary/openprimary.pdf [http://perma.cc/UK8V-4VAB] 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2015).  
87 Id. at 3. 
88 Id. at 1.  
89 Id. at 4.  
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C.  Despite a Lack of Current Empirical Support for the Proposition that 
Open Primaries Will Moderate the Political Views of Elected 
Representatives, Single Open Primaries Are Still Best Suited for 
Congressional Elections 
As detailed above in Part II.B, empirical studies have been unable to 
confirm or deny whether open primaries have the moderating effects on 
candidates that they are theorized to have. While this presents a formidable 
obstacle for backers of open primaries, as will be discussed below in Part 
D, it does not mean that a switch to open primaries would not have 
beneficial effects on the election process. Even without empirically 
documented proof of moderated political outcomes, ideological support for 
the moderating effects of open primaries remains strong. With voter 
participation in elections ranging from about 60% in presidential election 
years to 40% in midterm election years,90 widespread ideological support 
for open primaries could increase voter participation by decreasing feelings 
of apathy toward the political process. The prospect of election reform 
through the adoption of open primaries, coupled with academic theoretical 
support for the moderating effects of open primaries, could reduce this 
apathy. Such a situation might motivate voters to participate in primaries 
that they had not in the past in hopes of taking advantage of a renewed 
chance to have their voices heard in a new type of primary election. It is 
quite possible that open primaries have not been adopted in enough 
jurisdictions to allow the types of studies detailed above to provide a clear 
picture of their results in practice on a national scale, as is proposed by the 
Act. Whether or not this possibility is a statistical truth is likely to be 
unimportant to an average voter during the advent of widespread open 
primary systems; a lack of conclusive studies with findings undermining 
the open primary system is reason enough to give the proposed new system 
a chance. 
The fact remains that politics in the United States remains more 
polarized than ever before.91 This is the result of many factors, and despite 
the lack of empirical support, one of the prevailing theories as to a 
contributing cause continues to be the idea that in closed primaries, 
candidates are incentivized to appeal to their most extreme constituents.92 
Commentators observe that when politics are polarized to this extent, both 
unified and divided forms of government are likely to tend to extreme 
forms of themselves.93 When the government is divided, that is, when 
                                                                                                                          
90 Mark N. Franklin, Electoral Participation, in CONTROVERSIES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR 83 
(Richard G. Niemi & Herbert F. Wiesberg eds., 2010). 
91 See sources cited supra note 56 (providing findings on polarization in American politics today).  
92 Zhang, supra note 53, at 631. 
93 Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy 
in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 325 (2011). 
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different parties control either the House, Senate, or Presidency, in a 
polarized political environment it tends to produce politics of 
“confrontation, indecision, and deadlock.”94 “To the extent anything gets 
done, diluted, discrete compromises may tend to replace ideologically 
coherent, large initiatives.”95 When the government is unified during 
highly polarized times, there is an increased risk that the system of checks 
and balances will break down; “a Congress controlled by the same party as 
the president is unlikely to be aggressive in overseeing the executive 
branch’s actions, exposing failings in the president’s administration, or 
holding the president accountable.”96 There is also the risk that “with the 
minority party removing itself from the legislative process and, in essence, 
simply opposing all legislative initiatives of the majority, there will be less 
checking and balancing within the legislative process.”97 
Richard Pildes has suggested that “[t]he single institutional change 
most likely to lead to some moderation of candidates and officeholders, 
across all elections, would be to change the design of primary elections.”98 
About half of all states use closed or semi-closed primaries.99 “The most 
ideologically committed and hardcore party activists tend to dominate 
closed primaries even more than they already dominate primaries in 
general”100 and, as a result, “closed primary winners are thought more 
likely to reflect the ideological extremes around which the median party 
activist centers.”101  
Primaries of the type proposed in the Act theoretically have the 
potential to decrease polarization by encouraging candidates to appeal to 
the center, shaping the policies enacted by those congressmen once elected. 
“The top-two primary is designed to increase the chances of election for 
moderates running for Congress or the state legislature, particularly in 
election districts that are overwhelmingly dominated by voters affiliated 
with one party.”102 The continued academic acceptance of the idea that 
open primaries carry with them the possibility of a moderating effect on 
politicians outweighs the mixed findings of some studies indicating this 
effect would not be realized, and supports the position in the Act that 
single open primaries should be given a chance on a national scale. If 
single open primaries turn out to be ineffective or have unforeseen 
consequences, primary systems could always revert to what they are 
                                                                                                                          
94 Id. at 326 (citation omitted).  
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 327.  
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 299.  
100 Id. 
101 Id. (emphasis omitted).  
102 Id. at 302 (citation omitted). 
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presently through appropriate legislation without any harm done.  
D.  Election Reform in the Form of Single Open Primaries Is Likely to Be 
Challenged by the Political Parties Themselves, but Will Survive These 
Challenges 
1.  There Are Preexisting Criticisms of Open Primary Systems 
Single open primaries like the one proposed in the Act are not without 
their criticisms.  
Proponents of more open primaries claim that they help 
produce more moderate candidates, more accurately reflect 
the median voter’s preferences, and encourage more citizen 
participation. Opponents claim that they take away from 
political parties’ freedom of association, impose more 
difficulties for minor party candidates to win elections, and 
that they in fact limit choice.103 
California, Louisiana, and Washington have used some form of the 
top-two primary system,104 and “widespread litigation against the top-two 
primary is continuously budding.”105 Some of this litigation has made it to 
the U.S. Supreme Court and “a rather inconsistent and incoherent 
jurisprudence regarding the law of primaries (which partially stems from 
its legal uncertainty in defining political parties)”106 has developed.  
Many of the challenges have been based on issues of forced 
association when parties are not free to exclude participants or control self-
designated labels of candidates.107 The Court has “generally been 
deferential to political parties’ First Amendment rights to freedom of 
association,”108 declining to force parties to affiliate with candidates that 
they reject,109 and allowing parties to exclude voters from their 
primaries.110 “On the other hand, there is a competing recognition of 
stronger state regulatory interests that protect ‘the overall integrity of the 
historic electoral process.’”111 Blanket primaries similar to the system 
suggested by Representative Delaney have been struck down where the top 
candidates became the official nominees of their respective parties,112 but 
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“nonpartisan” blanket primaries where the top-two candidates advanced 
regardless of political party have been upheld. The rationale behind this 
distinction is that when the two candidates who move on are not “official” 
nominees, the impact on associational rights is lessened.113 
Section 3 of the Act, “Ability of Candidates to Disclose Political Party 
Preferences,” provides: 
(a) OPTION OF CANDIDATES TO DECLARE POLITICAL PARTY 
PREFERENCE.—At the time a candidate for the office of 
Member of the House of Representatives files to run for such 
office, the candidate shall have the option of declaring a 
political party preference, and the preference chosen (if any) 
shall accompany the candidate’s name on the ballot for the 
election for such office.  
(b) DESIGNATION FOR CANDIDATES NOT DECLARING 
PREFERENCE.—If a candidate does not declare a political 
party preference under subsection (a), the designation “No 
Party Preference” shall accompany the candidate’s name on 
the ballot for the election for such office.  
(c) NO PARTY ENDORSEMENT IMPLIED.—The selection of a 
party preference by a candidate under subsection (a) shall not 
constitute or imply endorsement of the candidate by the party 
designated, and no candidate in a general election shall be 
deemed the official candidate of any party by virtue of his or 
her selection in the primary.114 
This section alleviates concerns about forced association in violation of 
the First Amendment, and gives the single open primary the air of 
nonpartisanship that the Supreme Court has indicated it requires.115 Section 
4 of the Act, “Protection of Rights of Political Parties” further emphasizes 
this point by explicitly stating that  
[n]othing in this Act shall restrict the right of individuals to 
join or organize into political parties or in any way restrict 
the right of private association of political parties. Nothing in 
this Act shall restrict a party’s right to contribute to, endorse, 
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or otherwise support a candidate for the office of Member of 
the House of Representatives.116  
To assuage the fears of the parties themselves, the language of the Act 
allows parties to “establish such procedures as it sees fit to endorse or 
support candidates or otherwise participate in all elections,”117 and to 
“informally designate candidates for election to such an office at a party 
convention or by whatever lawful mechanism the party may choose, other 
than pursuant to a primary election held by a State.”118 Further, the Act 
allows a political party to “adopt such rules as it sees fit for the selection of 
party officials (including central committee members, presidential electors, 
and party officers), including rules restricting participation in elections for 
party officials to those who disclose a preference for that party at the time 
of registering to vote.”119 With these two sections, Representative Delaney 
made it clear that the single open primary scheme set out in the Act would 
be nonpartisan and not implicate the concerns of infringing on First 
Amendment associational rights for which other primary schemes have 
previously been struck down.  
The Supreme Court has held that all election laws invariably impose 
some type of burden on individual voters.120 Some such laws are subject to 
strict scrutiny, but in general a more flexible standard in the form of a 
balancing test applies.121 “A court considering a challenge to a state 
election law must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that 
the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by 
the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into 
consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to 
burden the plaintiff's rights.’”122  
Because the Supreme Court has previously applied strict scrutiny in 
cases dealing with statutory burdens of the associational rights of political 
parties relating to primary elections,123 any challenge to this portion of the 
Act is likely to allege that an impermissible burden on First Amendment 
associational rights has been imposed by forcing all parties to compete in a 
single open primary in order to get strict scrutiny review. Indeed, this is the 
form that some of the challenges to open primaries in California124 and 
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Washington125 have taken.  
To defeat these types of challenges, defenders of the Act would have to 
demonstrate that the portion mandating single open primaries is a narrowly 
tailored regulation that advances compelling government interests.126 Proof 
that this provision of the Act is narrowly tailored comes from Sections 3 
and 4, as discussed earlier in this Part. Concerns about burdens on the right 
of association caused by misidentification by voters of the parties that 
candidates belong to, as were put forth in Tashjian v. Republican Party of 
Connecticut,127 are addressed in Section 3(c)’s assurances that just because 
a candidate identifies with a party, official support is not to be implied.128 
Concerns about burdens imposed on the First Amendment right to 
expression by choosing a candidate are addressed in Section 4, as it 
explains that the Act does not interfere with parties’ own internal selection 
and nomination processes.  
As explained in Part II.C above, a compelling governmental interest 
supporting the Act is to reduce polarization and increase the functionality 
of Congress. As shown above in Part II.B, it will be difficult for defenders 
of the Act to find empirical support for the proposition that a single open 
primary will moderate Representatives that are ultimately elected, but they 
can point to the limitations of studies conducted to date in order to attempt 
to write them off as inconclusive. Importantly, while these studies do not 
directly support the moderating effects of open primaries, it can be argued 
that they are too narrow and not conclusive enough to disprove the theory. 
Once that argument is addressed, the defenders of the Act can focus, and 
primarily rely on, policy and theoretical justifications to support their 
position. These theoretical justifications are supported by academic writing 
on the subject in the form of articles like those cited above demonstrating 
first that Congress is dysfunctional in its current state, and second, that, at 
least in theory, single open primaries could have a moderating effect on 
which candidates are elected and cause Congress to function more 
cooperatively and productively. In light of the minimal burdens imposed 
on the associational rights of political parties, kept to a minimum by the 
Act itself; the strong theoretical support for the moderating effects of open 
primaries; and the highly compelling governmental interest in protecting 
the integrity—and perceived integrity—of the electoral process, this 
provision of the Act has a fighting chance to survive strict scrutiny. If 
proponents of the Act are lucky in court, their burden will not be nearly as 
high; when an election law provision imposes only reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment 
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rights of voters, the government’s important regulatory interests are 
generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.129 
III.  ELECTION DAY AS A FEDERAL HOLIDAY 
Section 5 of the Act is called “Treatment of Election Day in the Same 
Manner as Legal Public Holiday for Purposes of Federal Employment.” It 
is one of the shorter sections of the Act, and states that for the purposes of 
federal employment, Election Day should be treated as a legal public 
holiday as described in 5 U.S.C. § 6103.130 It also calls for a Sense of 
Congress Resolution to be passed regarding treatment of Election Day by 
private employers, stating: “It is the sense of Congress that private 
employers in the United States should give their employees a day off on 
the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November in 2016 and each 
even-numbered year thereafter to enable the employees to cast votes in the 
elections held on that day.”131 Congress has the power to regulate the times 
that congressional elections are held pursuant to Article I, Section 4, of the 
Constitution, and to make laws under the “necessary and proper” clause of 
Article I, Section 8.132 All that is needed under § 6103 for Congress to 
create a holiday is that it pass a statute doing so.133 
A.  Past Treatment of Election Day 
Though the number of people eligible to vote in U.S. elections has 
increased since 1789, “throughout American history the number of people 
who exercise the right to vote has dramatically declined in proportion to 
the number of people that have the right to vote.”134 In the earliest years of 
American history, there were a variety of social forces that compelled 
eligible voters to cast their votes on Election Day.135 Elections for 
representatives to colonial assemblies were usually treated as major 
celebrations; people had to travel considerable distances to cast their votes, 
and once there, congregated in groups to catch up and converse with one 
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another.136 These events were so popular that even large numbers of 
Americans ineligible to vote attended for the festivities.137 “Elections were 
lively public events, in which ‘amid the continuous electioneering and 
political arguments, picnics, drinking, and boisterous celebration went on 
throughout each polling day.’”138 Making attendance even more enticing, 
the events usually ended with celebration feasts.139 During the 1800’s, 
political parties took on the responsibility of “organizing festivities for 
election day.”140 This festive atmosphere continued through the nineteenth 
century, and was at its height for elections involving larger-than-life 
figures like Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln.141  
B.   Modern Changes 
One of the first changes marking the shift from treating Election Day 
as a public celebration to the “private experience it is today”142 was the 
transition to written ballots. Before then, “‘voting was … an oral and 
public act: Men assembled before election judges, waited for their names 
to be called, and then announced which candidates they supported.’”143 By 
1850 “almost all states had changed over to written ballots.”144 However, 
the early process of casting written ballots remained essentially a public 
act.145 Political parties were responsible for distributing paper ballots with 
the names of their candidates on them, and these ballots were 
distinguishable from one another even when folded for submission.146 
Within the polling place, voters simply placed their ballots into boxes or 
handed them to election officials in front of others.147 Further, ballots being 
marked or printed on distinctive paper ensured that there was no secrecy as 
to how a person had voted.148 
In the mid-1800’s and earlier, political parties functioned as organizers 
of elections. They  
established permanent premises at locations where “the 
faithful gathered to talk politics, drink cider, organize parades 
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and rallies, and read campaign literature.” In election years, 
these meetings often took place on a weekly basis as party 
loyalists solicited new members and prepared for festivities 
by procuring torchlights, uniforms, and fireworks for 
parades. Political parties also distributed honorific titles and 
positions—President, Vice President, doorkeeper—to their 
members, providing incentives to serve the party as well as a 
sense of solidarity. Most importantly, they mobilized the 
electorate to come out on election days.149 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, a significant increase in 
government control over political parties and elections themselves brought 
about “the end of election days as boisterous public holidays.”150 States and 
municipalities “cracked down on political parties that had, by this time, 
become notoriously corrupt, particularly in urban areas.”151 
Also around this time, in 1845, Congress chose a uniform date for 
presidential elections. The day for choosing presidential electors was 
initially set as “the first Tuesday in November,”152 in years divisible by 
four.153 Subsequently, it was pointed out that, in some years, the period 
between the first Tuesday in November and the first Wednesday in 
December, when the electors are required to meet in their state capitals to 
vote, would be more than thirty-four days, in violation of the existing 
Electoral College law.154 To remedy this problem, the date for choosing 
presidential electors was moved to the Tuesday after the first Monday in 
November, codifying Tuesday elections.155 
Procedural changes were further exacerbated by dramatic social 
changes like “the transformed ideal of citizenship embodied by the 
educated individual voter, the emergence of the expert-run administrative 
state as a new locus of policy decision making, the rise of interest groups 
as a means to influence government, [] the breakdown of the gendered 
construction of citizenship as male,”156 and the enfranchisement of African 
American voters.157 Official ballots, adopted in part to promote 
transparency and accountability, and in part to act as literacy tests to 
disenfranchise minority groups,158 worked to increase the air of formality 
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and secrecy surrounding elections.159 All of these changes throughout the 
nineteenth century contributed to the transition from Election Day being 
treated as a national celebration to it being the not particularly exciting 
event that it has become in modern times. 
C.   Benefits of Election Day as a Federal Holiday 
Other industrialized democracies, specifically Finland and Sweden, 
have had success in moving their election days to holidays or weekends.160 
In the United States, only fifteen states, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, and Wisconsin, make 
Election Day a state holiday.161 The holiday means different things in 
different states: “[i]n most of these states, state employees do not work and 
most government offices are closed; only some states close schools.”162 A 
national holiday is needed for congressional elections “because this is the 
only way to ensure that private sector employees get off from work.”163 
 “Without doubt, one of the biggest turnout drains among those who 
are already registered stems from the simple logistical fact that a good 
number of people cannot take the time off from a normal working day to 
vote.”164 When the voters that are able to make time to vote after they get 
out of work show up to the polling place, long lines serve as a deterrent.165 
“[V]oting lines are usually busiest after the evening commute.”166 Political 
activist groups such as “Why Tuesday?”167 have picked up on these 
statistics, advocating weekend voting, and noting that  
U.S. Census data has long indicated the #1 reason voters 
gave for not making it out to the polls was “too busy/couldn’t 
get time off to vote.” In 2010, 27% of nonvoters gave this 
answer. After the 2014 midterm elections, a staggering 69% 
of nonvoters didn’t cast a ballot because they were stuck at 
school or work, or were too busy, out of town, sick or forgot, 
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according to Pew.168 
Surprisingly, almost no studies exist that compare voter turnout rates in 
states or countries where Election Day has been moved to a holiday or 
weekend to the turnout rates existing before the switch. However, there is 
evidence that states and countries with Election Day treated as a holiday or 
falling on a weekend have higher voter turnout rates than the United States 
currently does on a national level.169 Thus, moving Election Day to a 
weekend or treating it as a holiday does have an association with increased 
voter turnout, but correlation has not been proven. Even without strong 
correlative proof, it makes sense in light of the fact that lines at polling 
stations appear longest before and after work170 that removing the workday 
from the equation would allow more voters to access the polls at a steady 
pace throughout the course of Election Day. It is possible that potential 
voters would take an Election Day holiday to relax or go on vacation, and 
still not vote, but that is a slight risk compared to the potentially significant 
benefit to American democracy of increasing continually diminishing voter 
turnout.  
One of the simplest ways to solve the problem of low voter turnout and 
to return to having voting on Election Day become a priority for voters as 
it was at prior times in American history is to make the day something to 
look forward to. It is unlikely that there would be a challenge to this 
provision of the Act in the courts, so all that would be needed to enact this 
reform would simply be to pass it in Congress. Making Election Day a 
federal holiday as the Act suggests would greatly reduce the cost of voting 
to individual voters, incentivize voters to go the polls by freeing up 
dedicated time for the task, and renew interest and participation in 
elections.  
IV.  CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING REFORM 
Finally, Section 6 of the Act calls for “a study of the feasibility and 
desirability of enacting national standards and criteria for Congressional 
redistricting” to be carried out by the Comptroller General and reported to 
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Congress within a year of the passage of the Act.171 As a proposal not 
directly related to the conduct of elections, Congress has the authority for 
this section under Article I, Section 8.172 
A.   Redistricting and Gerrymandering 
Article 1, Section 4 of the Constitution delegates the authority for 
drawing congressional districts from which Representatives are elected to 
the States.173 “[W]hile the clause gives Congress the power to supersede 
state regulations of congressional elections, Congress has not used this 
power to divest states of redistricting authority.”174 Partisan 
gerrymandering “is the method of creating electoral districts that provide 
the greatest electoral benefit to the political party drawing the 
boundaries”175 and occurs when a political party in control of the state 
legislature or state redistricting process draws the lines in such a way that 
one party is guaranteed to win based on the traditional voting preferences 
of the voters included within the district.176 
Two techniques, “packing” and “cracking,” are used to accomplish 
gerrymandering.177 Packing “occurs when the boundaries of an electoral 
district are changed in order to create an area that incorporates a majority 
of people who vote in a similar way.”178 It creates a few districts with huge 
majorities of like-minded voters, “making it easier for the party in power to 
win or maintain control in the majority of the other districts.”179 Cracking 
occurs “when an area with a high concentration of similar voters is split 
among several districts, ensuring that these voters have a small minority in 
several districts rather than a large majority in one, thereby diluting the 
voting power of the group.”180 In either method, the outcome “is to draw 
boundaries in such a way that the groups opposing the new boundaries are 
concentrated so as to minimize their representation and influence.”181 
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B.   Problems Arising from Partisan Gerrymandering 
“Gerrymandering is the method of creating electoral districts that 
provide the greatest electoral benefit to the political party drawing the 
boundaries.”182 There are several harms that can result to legislatures from 
partisan gerrymandering, and all share the common criticism of increasing 
“the ability of the minority to dilute the will of the majority.”183 The 
practice of redrawing electoral districts in order to gain a political benefit 
for one party has a long history, but recently it has become more 
extreme.184 “For example, in the 2002 Congressional elections, 356 out of 
the 435 House of Representatives members’ districts were decided by 
margins of more than twenty percent and only four incumbents who faced 
non-incumbent challengers were defeated.”185 Further, “[t]he 2004 election 
of the House of Representatives was the fourth consecutive election in 
which the incumbent success rate was at least ninety-eight percent.”186 
One such harm is referred to as partisan bias.187 “Theories of partisan 
bias condemn districting arrangements that make it easier for one party 
than the other to convert votes cast in its favor on Election Day into 
legislative seats.”188 In this instance, the harm takes place 
when one party can capture a greater share of seats in the 
legislature than the other party for a given level of electoral 
support. For example, if Democrats garner 53 percent of the 
vote and thereby capture 60 percent of the seats in the 
legislature, then in an unbiased system the Republicans will 
also capture 60 percent of the legislative seats if they garner 
53 percent of the vote. If the Republicans were to capture a 
greater seat share in this situation—say 70 percent—the 
system would contain partisan bias in favor of the 
Republicans.189 
Another potential harm is the reduction of electoral competition.190 
Proponents of this theory argue “that partisan gerrymandering is harmful 
where it leads to a constriction of the competitive processes by which 
voters can express choice.”191 A third potential harm is that partisan 
gerrymandering creates increased polarization in the legislature by 
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removing the incentive to appeal to centrists in elections, and making it so 
that candidates need to appeal to only the most dedicated members of a 
party’s base.192 What each of these problems has in common is that they 
reduce the faith of voters in the representative character of government, 
thereby disincentivizing them from voting in the first place because they 
feel like their votes do not influence the outcome of elections in a 
meaningful way. 
C.  Legislative Action Is Needed 
Judicial remedies for the harms of partisan gerrymandering have been 
largely ineffective, and so legislative action is needed. Court challenges to 
districting drawing have often been regarded as non-justiciable political 
questions, and “[o]nly in the last forty years has the judiciary entered the 
political thicket of apportionment.”193 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
“has largely avoided the apportionment-related issue of partisan 
gerrymandering.”194 The first time that the Court made a significant 
contribution to this area was in Baker v. Carr.195 In that case, the Court 
developed a six factor structure for analyzing political question issues, 
found apportionment to be a justiciable non-political question, and adopted 
the “one person, one vote” standard “requiring legislatures to create 
districts with equal populations.”196 This “began the so-called 
apportionment revolution, in which redistricting became primarily driven 
by legal decisions.”197 These doctrines continued to develop in relation to 
redistricting with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and several racial 
gerrymandering cases.198 Even with this standard in effect, courts still had 
difficulty addressing the qualitative issues of fair and effective 
representation.199 In cases dealing with this issue, such as Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot,200 the Supreme Court used the Fifteenth Amendment, rather than 
the Fourteenth as in Baker, to hold that the gerrymander at issue in that 
case was “an illegal method of minimizing the impact of a group of voters’ 
influence because the new boundaries did not conform to the traditional 
districting principles.”201 
Importantly with these cases, “[e]ven though the Court established 
standards of review for racial gerrymandering, the Court remained silent as 
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to the issue of political gerrymandering.”202 The Court’s first opportunity 
to directly address partisan gerrymandering was in the 1972 case Gaffney 
v. Cummings.203 There, the Court upheld the plan, stating that political 
considerations always played a part in a redistricting plan, but hinted that 
plans which unduly discriminated against certain political groups might be 
unconstitutional.204 In 1986, the case of Davis v. Bandemer205 “established 
a formal judicial role in partisan gerrymandering disputes” and “suggested 
the coming of a second reapportionment revolution,” but “failed to provide 
a clear standard to the lower courts when dealing with these issues.”206  
A plurality of four Justices argued for a standard that 
required plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination against 
a political group as well as a discriminatory effect on that 
group. Justice White, writing for the plurality, did not 
consider the showing of the intent prong a difficult one 
because districting involves political considerations. 
However, the effects prong required a showing that the group 
had been repeatedly denied the opportunity to affect the 
political process. This requirement went beyond showing that 
the results of an election were not proportional to the relative 
strength of the parties. In order to show an unconstitutional 
gerrymander, a group of like-minded voters would need to 
show an inability to convert their majority numbers into an 
electoral victory over a number of election cycles. The 
plurality required a showing of discriminatory effect even if 
the group had established discriminatory intent.207 
Seven Justices found the redistricting plan at issue constitutional, but 
used different reasoning.208 Justice White’s plurality opinion was followed 
by courts going forward, but even after members of the Court “went so far 
as to find that partisan gerrymandering might impose a greater threat to 
Equal Protection than electoral districts of unequal population”209 just a 
few years prior, “only in Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin did 
a court find a constitutional violation using the Bandemer standards.”210 
Nearly twenty years after Bandemer, “the Supreme Court, in Vieth v. 
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Jubelirer,211 faced the issue of partisan gerrymandering and again 
attempted to provide proper judicial standards.”212 In a change of course, 
“[w]riting for the Court, Justice Scalia determined the claim represented a 
political question [lacking judicially manageable standards,] and that the 
Supreme Court lacked the ability to decide the matter.”213 One concurring 
opinion “agreed with the plurality as to the judgment, but disagreed that all 
partisan gerrymandering claims fall within the political question doctrine,” 
and “[i]n three dissenting opinions, four Justices argued partisan 
gerrymandering was a justiciable issue and proposed possible standards to 
evaluate the claims.”214 
On top of the difficulty in getting political gerrymandering issues in 
front of a court, some scholars believe that the Constitution does not even 
provide a judicial remedy for this kind of problem: 
Although there is a consensus that gerrymandering may 
violate the Constitution, there is a marked disagreement as to 
why. To begin with, there is disagreement about which 
provisions of the Constitution gerrymanders violate. 
Depending upon whom one reads, gerrymandering 
supposedly violates the First Amendment, the Guarantee 
Clause, the Elections Clause, the Equal Protection Clause. A 
few go further, claiming that although gerrymandering 
violates no specific clause, it violates the Constitution’s 
overall structure. Perhaps just as important, there is 
disagreement about the constitutional evils caused by 
gerrymandering. Some claim that gerrymanders are 
unconstitutional because they dilute votes; others lament that 
they generate uncompetitive elections; and still others say 
that the evil is that gerrymanders produce extremist 
legislators, who are unwilling to compromise. . . . In the case 
of gerrymandering, we believe that the dissensus about why 
and when gerrymanders are unconstitutional reflects rather 
serious shortcomings with the underlying assertion that the 
Constitution somehow regulates gerrymandering.215 
These scholars base their arguments on the fact that the “Constitution 
never sets out criteria for the proper composition of the legislature, the 
suitable amount of electoral competitiveness, or the correct ideological 
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balance of legislators within a legislature.”216 Further, they state that “[t]he 
infinite number of possible ideal districting baselines [to measure others 
against] makes it all but impossible to suppose that the Constitution 
implicitly singles out one such baseline and mandates it.”217 They dismiss 
arguments “that gerrymanders unconstitutionally deny the electorate 
competitive election” by saying the arguments “exalt[] a preference for 
competitive elections that is constitutionally immaterial;”218 the preference 
is simply not there in the text. Most convincingly, they argue that “[t]he 
Supreme Court went as far as was plausible into the political thicket when 
it discovered the ‘one-person, one-vote’ requirement. Any further, and the 
Court indulges the view that the Constitution prohibits whatever outrages 
judicial and scholarly sensibilities.”219 
Whether or not these scholars can convince courts that the Constitution 
does not provide remedies against perceived gerrymandering, Congress is 
free to take action at any time.220 “The Constitution gives states the ability 
to undermine the people, but names Congress as the protector of the 
people’s right to vote for House members.”221 However, as detailed above, 
“recent trends show Congress failing in that duty.”222 Continual failures by 
Congress to ensure fair and representative elections “recently led Justice 
Stevens to conclude that ‘ample evidence demonstrates that many of 
today’s congressional representatives owe their allegiance not to “the 
People of the several states” but to the mercy of state legislatures,’ which 
secure such results through partisan gerrymandering.”223 In this way, 
partisan gerrymandering harms federalism. It “diminishes the quality of 
representation in the House and makes House election results dependent 
upon control of state government. That latter effect both contravenes the 
original conception of federalism and diminishes the ability of voters to 
choose differing state and federal policies.”224 When federalism is 
endangered, there are serious concerns for the government at both the state 
and federal level.  
To the extent that basic principles of federalism require the 
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separation of state government from the federal, failure to 
maintain separation threatens the legitimacy of the House as 
a representative body. The legitimacy of any one state’s 
congressional delegation is a national matter because every 
state’s citizens will naturally want the federal government to 
be legitimate: an unrepresentative delegation could taint the 
entire legislative process, and tainted laws affect all 
citizens.225 
Finally, “[u]nlike reform by Congress, reform by the judiciary has no 
inherent legitimacy.”226 If the main complaint about gerrymandering comes 
from its diminishing of the perceived legitimacy of elections, and therefore 
laws made by the legislature, it makes sense that the legislature should be 
the one to restore its own legitimacy in the eyes of voters. 
D.   Implications for Future Partisan Gerrymandering Cases 
The report to Congress by the Comptroller General called for in the 
Act could provide a structure for courts to build upon in future partisan 
gerrymandering cases. At this time, this argument is speculative, as the Act 
is vague as to what the contents of the Comptroller General’s report would 
be. However, if the Comptroller General reported that enacting national 
standards for congressional redistricting was desirable due to the failings of 
past redistrictings across the country, challengers to present or future 
partisan gerrymanders could use the report to support their arguments. 
Such findings would need to catalogue redistrictings in the past that 
harmed an identifiable political party’s chance to effectively influence the 
political process over an extended period of time. 
Hopefully the Comptroller General’s report would provide some more 
compelling empirical data proving the harms that are theorized to be 
caused by partisan gerrymanders. Current studies suggest that 
gerrymandering is not an important cause of polarization; the Senate has 
become just as polarized as the House of Representatives, and Senate 
districts are not significantly gerrymandered along partisan lines.227 
Additionally, “the evidence is weak that House polarization causes Senate 
polarization or that gerrymandering has polarized the House.”228 However, 
mathematical projections, as opposed to empirical observations, do support 
the idea that gerrymandering distorts voters’ choices in who ultimately gets 
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elected. Researchers at Duke University 
varied the state’s congressional districts to calculate what the 
outcome of the 2012 U.S. House of Representatives elections 
might have been had the state’s districts been drawn to 
emphasize nonpartisan boundaries. The team re-ran the 
election 100 times—using the same votes as in 2012 and 
tweaking the voting map with only the legal requirements of 
a redistricting plan in mind. Not once did they get the split of 
Democratic and Republican seats seen in the actual 
election.229  
The average simulated election elected seven or eight Democrats and 
five or six Republicans, a marked difference from the actual outcome of 
nine Republicans and four Democrats.230 “During the 2012 elections in 
North Carolina, Republicans took nine of the state’s 13 U.S. House seats 
although 51 percent of the two-party vote went to Democratic 
candidates.”231 The Comptroller General’s report would likely focus on 
empirical data, as the focus of the office is to carry out “audit, evaluative, 
and investigative assignments and [to provide] legal analyses to the 
Congress.”232 Whatever the findings, they would be a welcome addition to 
the mixed studies on the true effects of partisan gerrymandering. 
The report could also support the feasibility of future partisan 
gerrymandering litigation. Though Vieth contained a plurality opinion 
dismissing the partisan gerrymandering challenge in that case as a 
nonjusticiable political question, it is important to keep in mind that the 
holding was not from a majority of the Court.233 Thus, “Vieth did not 
resolve the question left open in Bandemer, namely, what are the judicially 
manageable standards to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims.”234  
Supported by the principle of stare decisis,235 future challengers to 
partisan gerrymanders could urge courts to return to Bandemer’s two-
pronged analysis, relying on the Comptroller General’s report to prove a 
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discriminatory effect.236 In Vieth the Court stated that the Bandemer 
standard had proved unmanageable in application, largely due to the 
inability of plaintiffs to prove a discriminatory effect over several 
elections.237 As stated above, a plurality of Justices in Bandemer argued for 
a standard that required plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination 
against a political group as well as a discriminatory effect on that group, 
characterized in Vieth as “the Bandemer plurality’s vague test of ‘denied 
its chance to effectively influence the political process.’”238 With a report 
from the Comptroller General detailing instances in recent history where 
partisan gerrymanders have denied a chance at effectively influencing the 
political process, challengers could satisfy this prong of the Bandemer test 
and redeem it as a manageable standard. If a plaintiff could prove that he 
had been a member of an identifiable party and voted for that party over a 
long period of time in a gerrymandered district where it was impossible for 
his party to elect a candidate due to partisan bias, he might have a claim 
strong enough to get past the Court’s concerns in Vieth.  
V.  THE OPEN OUR DEMOCRACY ACT AS A PACKAGE OF REFORMS 
On average less than fifty percent of eligible voters participate in 
national elections.239 “Even in a close national race where each vote holds 
significantly more practical sway, such as the 2000 Presidential election, 
turnout [does] not dramatically increase.”240 By conducting interviews and 
surveys, the New York Times found that “Americans do not vote because 
they see no reason to vote;” they felt that their votes had lost value both in 
influencing the results of elections and in symbolic value as a democratic 
virtue.241 Because of this, a worthy goal of any individual election reform 
is to reverse this demoralization and increase voter turnout by inspiring the 
hope that changes can be and are being made to the electoral process.  
Among other things, this low turnout harms perceptions of Congress as 
legitimate and representative. Those feelings can further encourage more 
eligible voters to abstain from voting. The Committee for the Study of the 
American Electorate, a nonpartisan research organization, “found that there 
are numerous ancillary societal problems that directly relate to 
nonvoting.”242  
These problems included “the fact that people who don’t vote tend not 
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to participate in other forms of political, civic, or social activity.”243 The 
Committee went on to further note that  
there is an inherent danger to the orderly process of 
democracy that results from a lack of participation by most 
voters. . . . Voting promotes the civility of the national 
dialogue and the habitual use of orderly and lawful processes 
to effect change. . . . An apathetic electorate that no longer 
participates in the process is a dangerous thing to a stable 
democracy. The possibility of unlawful conduct in order to 
create change becomes more likely.244  
According to one commentator, “[a] logical conclusion is that the lack 
of participation in the democratic process itself, not the breakdown of the 
American family, is the root of many societal ills. . . . Voting abstention 
and the general apathy of the electorate point to a loss of faith in the 
democratic system.”245  
These are the problems the Act directly seeks to address by 
encouraging voter turnout and therefore restoring faith in Congress and the 
American system of government. Creating single open primaries has the 
potential to incentivize political candidates to appeal to more centrist 
voters outside of the extremes of their parties, and to make voters feel like 
their voices have a better chance of being heard. This will address the 
problem of apathy by forcing politicians to campaign on issues and 
positions that are important to a wider group of people than at present. Not 
only will they have to appeal to voters across the ideological spectrum 
within their own parties, but they will also have to be palatable to 
potentially sympathetic voters in opposing parties because of the structure 
of the single open primary. This goal will be carried even further by reform 
of partisan gerrymandering after the study called for in the Act is 
completed. Redrawing of heavily gerrymandered districts will ensure that 
there is indeed a mix of party affiliations and ideologies within a given 
congressional district for a candidate to have to appeal to, thereby, in 
theory, further solidifying an ideological shift to the center. And finally, 
making Election Day a national holiday will give these newly involved 
voters a dedicated time to go and do their civic duty. Even more so than 
weekend voting, it will make voting easier for voters to fit into their 
schedule, and more formal recognition of the act of voting will go towards 
restoring the image of voting as a civic duty and virtue in a democratic 
society as it once was.  
Each of these three proposals would be effective in increasing voter 
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participation and perceptions of legitimacy in the political process, but all 
three together are stronger than any one or two alone. Without an Election 
Day holiday, gains made in increasing feelings of inclusion would be 
limited by the remaining problem of voters not having time to physically 
go to the polls. Without gerrymandering reform, candidates would still be 
speaking to voters that are ideologically very similar within their presently 
gerrymandered districts, and the moderating effects of the single open 
primary would be diminished. Without the change to a single open 
primary, one Republican and one Democrat would continue to necessarily 
run against each other in the final election, and the moderating effects of 
redrawn districts would be limited by the continued incentive to appeal to 
the extremes of political parties who are most likely to go out and vote in a 
given district.  
VI.  CONCLUSION  
Congress has the power to enact these reforms, and a strong interest in 
protecting its own legitimacy and the perceived integrity of the electoral 
process. On a national level, these reforms should each be desirable to all 
eligible voters, and so the Act should have the support of a wide portion of 
the electorate. The only obstacle to the passage of these reforms are the 
Congressmen themselves. It is too early in the legislative process to know 
what the arguments of the opponents of the Act will be, but, somewhat 
cynically, it is safe to speculate that the only motivation will be 
conservation of the power of individual incumbent Congressmen and their 
respective parties. The end goal of the reforms set out in the Act is to 
increase voter participation through increased inclusion and by providing 
an easy opportunity and heightened incentive to go and cast a vote so that 
individual voters start to feel like their voices are heard through elections. 
As this Comment has argued, the reforms are capable of having their 
intended effects if they are passed by Congress and fully enacted. 

